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Pathways, Contingencies, and the Secular in Iran’s 
First Revolution
Iran’s constitutional revolution of 1906 is arguably the most significant 
turn toward the secular in its modern history.1 I start this investigation by 
making a conceptual distinction between secularism and secularity.2 Here, 
secularism is defined as the ideologically-driven separation of religion and 
state according to an agenda, a blueprint, a model, that could be indige-
nously, or externally informed and is achieved with the assistance of the 
modern state and explicit political motivations. Secularity, on the other 
hand, is expressed in terms of a non-ideological separation that comes 
about unintentionally. In some accounts, this separation may take on evo-
lutionary connotations in terms of the natural separation of functions as 
a result of the growing complexity of a natural organism or social system. 
What I have in mind here is a separation of functions that is agent-driven 
but the secularity that emerges is both unintentional and unideological. In 
other words, separation is attained not because actors consciously distin-
guish between the religious and the political at the conceptual level, or ex-
perience a wholesale shift in belief systems, but because some new contexts 
open novel avenues for pursuing goals or interests that are experienced 
by actors as more effective than previously undifferentiated ones, without 
necessarily effecting conscious change, or any change, in belief systems. 
Approached in this way, the attained separations may be reversed if these 
avenues are no longer available, no longer attain the desired outcomes, or 
are less effective. This is not to deny that some belief systems have a ten-
dency to allow for a closer pairing of religion and politics compared to 
others; as such, it may be harder to separate the two, and easier to reverse 
course afterwards, but these are probabilistic tendencies and about the 
inertia of one context in contrast to another and not pre-destined, rigid 
1 Abbas Amanat, Iran: A Modern History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2017).
2 For this distinction, see Monika Wohlrab-Sahr and Marian Buchardt, “Multiple Secu-
larities: Toward a Cultural Sociology of Secular Modernities,” Comparative Sociology 11, 
no. 6 (2012); Christoph Kleine and Monika Wohlrab-Sahr, “Research Programme of the 
HCAS ‘Multiple Secularities-Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities’, ” Working Paper Se-
ries of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Beyond the West, Beyond Modernities” 1 (Leipzig 
University, 2016).
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pathways. Thus, pathways here are approached as probabilistic tendencies 
and not as tunnels dug under mountains of civilizational divide. In this 
view, civilizations themselves become malleable inclinations, leanings, pat-
terns, and not solid objects on a collision course.
To better appreciate the dynamics of this turn, the 1906 revolution is 
evaluated within the multi-layered pathways of the early 20th century. 
Multi-layered because simultaneous account of three pathways is taken, 
namely the global, the regional, and the local paths each with a historical past 
and genealogy of its own but which come together in early 20th-century Iran.
With the intensifying dynamics of globalization, Iranian actors were 
able to weave their local path into the global one and introduce a consti-
tution and a political system that was under the sway of the “world time.”3 
Ongoing dialogue of Iranian politics with regional developments, that is 
the developments in the Ottoman Empire in particular, but also more gen-
erally in the Islamic Middle East, made that transition easier. Yet, these 
ideological developments and other social factors associated with revolu-
tions were not sufficient to facilitate a constitutional revolution. Despite the 
presence of many ingredients, such a revolution remained highly unlikely 
in Iran at the time. But luck mattered. In other words, the constitutional 
revolution was due to a contingency that can only be properly appreciated 
by looking at the micro-dynamics of the conflict at one crucial juncture. 
In addition, this paper will make brief reference to the Ottoman Empire in 
order to further elucidate its argument.
While the imagery of historical layers and multiple temporalities owes 
a good deal to Braudel, it may be useful to clarify what I mean by contin-
gency or ‘grand events’ that run contrary to Braudel and are more in line 
with Sahlins and Sewell’s conceptualization.4 For Braudel, as for, say, many 
old-school structuralists, the fundamental deep, longue durée under- 
lying structures are the determinative forces of history. Drawing upon the 
metaphor of a deep underlying wave, a tsunami if you will, Braudel states 
3 Fernand Braudel, On History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980).
4 Marshall Sahlins, Historical Metaphors and Mythical Realities (Ann Arbor: University of 
Michigan Press, 1981); William H. Sewell, Jr., “Historical Events as Transformations of 
Structures: Inventing Revolution at Bastille,” Theory and Society 25, no. 6 (1996); William 
H. Sewell, Jr., “Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology,” in The Historic Turn in 
the Human Sciences, ed. Terence J. McDonald (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1996). The argument is further developed in William H. Sewell, Jr., Logics of History: Social 
Theory and Social Transformation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), 81–123.
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explicitly that events in history have the same status as foams on the sur-
face of waves: visible but ephemeral. In other words, what is reported by 
the journalist, is the object of analysis by the political scientist, or enlivens 
the narrative of the historian, are events that ride foam-like on top of deep 
waves of history and are as fleeting and insignificant. For Braudel even the 
French Revolution belongs to this category of events, without consequence 
of its own making, but an expression of deeper forces that would have sur-
faced without it. This brings to mind Tocqueville’s objection to the French 
Revolution taking credit for the intensifying state centralization drive and 
broadening public participation, developments that according to him were 
long under way before it and would have happened without it.5 This is in 
sharp contrast to my use of grand events that despite their foamy visibility 
penetrate the layers of history and effect change through reorganizing the 
multi-layered structures. These grand events are experienced at the level of 
actors as before and after occurrences, and while they retain a sense of con-
tinuity with the past, they are entirely new. In this sense, the past structures 
or layers of history are not obliterated but their relation revalued, resulting 
in unexpected and new contexts.6
1 The Global and Regional Paths
The global model of constitutionalism found its first expressions in the 
British parliament, the written American constitution, and, most of all, in 
the French Revolution.7 In them, constitutionalism congealed as a model 
without history,8 or as Anderson would have it, one that was modular,9 
and ready for adoption regardless of peculiarities of circumstance. Or at 
least this was how adherents of constitutionalism perceived it. In the late 
5 Alexis de Tocqueville, The Old Regime and the French Revolution (New York: Anchor 
Books, 1955). See also François Furet, Interpreting the French Revolution (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1981), 132–63.
6 Marshall Sahlins, Islands of History (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985).
7 In contrast to the gradualism of the British or exclusive reliance on political transforma-
tion as seen in the American Revolution, the French Revolution offered a rapid method 
of full-scale social and political transformation.
8 Nader Sohrabi, “Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman 
Empire, Iran and Russia, 1905–1908,” American Journal of Sociology 100, no. 6 (1995).
9 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na-
tionalism. Revised edition (London: Verso, 1991), 156.
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19th to early 20th century, the global trajectory became apparent as numer-
ous actors, independently or in connection with one another, decided that 
constitutionalism was the answer to their problems. This can be seen in 
the Meiji Restoration (1868) that eventually ended in the Meiji constitu-
tion (1889), in the Young Ottoman constitutional movement (1876), the 
Urabi revolt in Egypt (1881), the Russian Revolution of 1905, the Iranian 
Constitutional Revolution (1906), the Young Turk Revolution (1908), the 
Mexican Revolution (1910), the Republican revolution in Portugal (1910), 
and the Chinese Revolution of 1911. Even the October Revolution of 1917 
in Russia had its beginning in a constitutional movement that vied for re-
storing a strong parliament (Duma) along the path laid in 1905, but ended 
as a communist revolution that effected a dramatic change in the global 
trajectory of revolutions and set them on a new course.
Aside from the global models, the regional influence of Russia and the 
Ottoman Empire mattered greatly for Iran. Russia, a neighbor to both Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire, saw a massive constitutional movement and was 
successful in implementing a parliament in 1905. This encouraged both 
of its neighbors to quicken their efforts to join the global wave. Russia’s 
enormous Turkic population and intimate connections to the Iranian and 
Ottoman publics served as a channel of information transfer, and, in the 
Iranian case, a channel for the movement of revolutionaries themselves.10 
Iran was influenced by the Ottoman Empire’s earlier constitutional move-
ment, spearheaded by the Young Ottomans (1865–1878), that successfully 
indigenized Western constitutionalism by inventing a constitutional tradi-
tion for Islam and implemented a parliament. Although short-lived (1876–
1878), this experiment had a profound influence on the Islamic world. The 
Islamicized constitutionalism of the Young Ottomans11 was propagated by 
10 Ivar Spector, The First Russian Revolution: Its Impact on Asia (Englewood Cliffs: Pren-
tice-Hall, 1962); Houri Berberian, Roving Revolutionaries: Armenians and the Connected 
Revolutions in the Russian, Iranian, and Ottoman Worlds (Berkeley: University of Califor-
nia Press, 2019).
11 The first concepts reworked by the Young Ottomans were consultation and its varia-
tions (meşveret and şura) from which they developed a conception of representative gov-
ernment; community (ümmet) or people (halk) with political rights as a group and as 
individuals; consensus of the community (icma‘-i ümmet) and public opinion (efkar-ı 
umumi); fatherland (vatan) and nation (millet) beyond the religious community; citizens 
or subjects without distinctions of religion (tebaa); freedom and liberty (serbestiyet, hür-
riyet) as a divine grant; and the contract of investiture (biat) which gave the community 
the right to break it off if the ruler failed to fulfill his obligations. The theory of natural 
rights, the social contract, the delegation of those rights, methods of gauging legitimacy, 
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the Iranian intelligentsia among the clerics, merchants, guilds, and beyond. 
Overall, the Young Ottoman synthesis as it was reworked by the lay Iranian 
intelligentsia such as Yusuf Khan Mustashar al-Dawlah,12 Mirza Malkum 
Khan and intellectual circles had more immediate practical and political 
impact on the event under consideration than the more thoroughly indig-
enized, but later developed, shi‘ite constitutionalism of Nai’ni.13
2 The Inertia of the Local Path
Considering local modes of action, the Tobacco Rebellion (1891–1892), 
an anti-state uprising that derailed a tobacco monopoly being granted to a 
British company, was a significant example. It was the first social movement 
and a theory of resistance were all developed here. Related to these were also the notions 
of separation of powers, of the interests and rights of the nation, and of servants of the 
nation and service to the nation. Not all these ideas were necessarily well developed or 
taken to their logical conclusion. For instance, the theory of resistance was not extended 
to mean the right to revolt; the idea of national sovereignty did not end in republicanism. 
Yet this was the most successful constitutional political discourse in the Islamic lands to 
date; its resonance is still felt today. Şerif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: 
A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1962), 190–92, 276–82; Niyazi Berkes, The Development of Secularism in Turkey 
(New York: Routledge, 1998), 205; Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 
1798–1939 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983). The two Quranic passages 
cited to legitimize consultation “wa-amruhumshura baynahum” (whose affairs are set-
tled by mutual consultation) and “wa-shawirhum fi ’l-amr” (and seek their counsel in 
all affairs) are supplemented with Prophetic tradition and other religious sources. See 
Ash-Shura (“Consultation”) and Al-‘Imran (“The Family of Imran”) in: Ahmed Ali, Al-
Qur’an, A Contemporary Translation (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988). For 
an early example of this practice, see Nizam al-Mulk, Siyasatnamah, ed. ‘Abbas Iqbal 
(Tehran: Intisharat-i Asatir [485/1092] 1372/1993, 2nd ed.), 112–13. For differing inter-
pretations of the abiding powers and functions of consultation in early Islamic history, 
see Bernard Lewis, “Mashwara,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, second edition, ed. Peri Bear-
man et al., 724–25 (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 1991) and Roy Mottahedeh, “Consultation and 
the Political Process in the Islamic Middle East of the 9th, 10th and 11th centuries,” in Islam 
and Public Law, ed. Chibli Mallat (London: Graham & Trotman, 1993). For the late Ot-
toman period, see Carter V. Findley, “Madjlis al-Shūrā,” in Encyclopaedia of Islam, Second 
Edition, ed. Peri Bearman et al. http://dx.doi.org/10.1163/1573-3912_islam_SIM_4745; 
Ami Ayalon, Language and Change in the Arab Middle East (New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1987), 119–22.
12 Mirza Yusuf Khan Mustashar al-Dawlah, Yak Kalimah, ed. Sadiq Sajjadi (Tehran: Nashr-i 
Tarikh-i Iran, 1985).
13 Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi‘ism and Constitutionalism in Iran: A Study of the Role Played by the 
Persian Residents of Iraq in Iranian Politics (Leiden: Brill, 1977). Nai’ni’s impact was to be 
sensed in later periods.
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deserving the label ‘national,’ thanks to the telegraph and was also the first 
organized under clerical leadership. The alliances that emerged between the 
clerics, the merchants, the guilds, and a broad cross-section of the Iranian 
public alerted the intelligentsia to the mobilization capacity of the clerics. We 
observe this realization first-hand in the oppositional journal Qanun (The 
Law, 1890–1900), published by Malkum, with its quick turn toward the lan-
guage of religion, and concessions offered to the ulama to take up the leader-
ship of a future constitutional movement. Malkum envisioned the ulama as 
leaders of a future legislative assembly, and allayed their suspicions about the 
assembly’s law-making and challenge to shari‘a: 
Some imagine that by means of this publication, we intend to propagate 
new laws in Iran. This is false absolutely. We have no intention of creating 
new laws for the Iranian people. We consider the laws and principles that 
God, and the prophet, and the sages have taught the Islamic clergy to be 
correct and sufficient.14
In this future legal order, the principal role was assigned to the clerics and 
Malkum argued that the reformists’ only desire was to assemble and enact 
the laws of Islam.15 A short while later membership of Malkum’s envisioned 
council was broadened to include the lay public with deliverance found in 
“gathering the clergy and the learned (fużalā) in a National Consultative 
[Assembly] (shūrā-yi millī) to put in order the governmental affairs in ac-
cordance with the laws of Islam...”16
Malkum urged the public to rally behind the clerics and prompt them 
to action. In fact, clerical participation in the Tobacco Rebellion was largely 
due to public pressure from below that held them accountable regarding 
their claim to community leadership.17 As such, the Tobacco Rebellion 
served as a dress rehearsal for the constitutional movement18 in the alli-
ances it created, its national scope, its clerical leadership, and the clerics’ 
enhanced prestige for successfully representing the community.
14 Qanun, no. 6, 18 July 1890/1 Zi al-Haja 1307: 1.
15 Qanun, no. 8: 3; Qanun, no. 7: 2.
16 Qanun, no. 9: 3.
17 Faridun Adamiyat, Shurish Bar Imtiyaznamah-’i Rizhi: Tahlil-i Siyasi (Tehran: Payam, 
1981), 19–20, 30–31, 34–35, 60, 65–67, 74–75, 133–34, and 138–40; Amanat, Iran.
18 For this view among the contemporaries, see for example, Ihtisham al-Saltanah, Khati-
rat-i Ihtisham al-Saltanah, ed. M. Mussavi (Tehran: Zavvar, 1988), 572.
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A prominent authority on state-clerical relations of this period, Hamid 
Algar, presents two general reasons for the clerical participation. On the one 
hand, he attributes shi’ite clerics’ assumption of leadership in oppositional 
movements to their consideration of worldly authority as illegitimate.19 On 
the other hand, he emphasizes their institutional conflict with the Qajar 
state which I find more convincing. Unlike the Ottoman clerical establish-
ment, which had become progressively hierarchical and absorbed into the 
state, Iranian clerics had preserved their decentralized nature and insti-
tutional autonomy to a large extent; they were dependent on state patro- 
nage but were also largely independent of the state. They continued to per-
form many social functions in the daily lives of the public, most important-
ly in education and the administration of justice.20 In the late 19th century, 
the courts presided over by the clergy (shar‘ courts) were in competition 
with those under state jurisdiction (‘urf). “Throughout the nineteenth cen-
tury,” Algar has noted, “this interaction of two types of courts, combined 
with the lack of any formal demarcation of their jurisdiction, was a major 
source of conflict between the state and the ulama.”21 The reforms initiated 
by the state in the judiciary and education, another clerical domain, inten-
sified this tension.22
The conflict was a contest between a reforming state interested in ex-
tending its reach more widely and deeply and a clerical estate steadfast on 
denying or limiting it. But as the state gestures were mild, the clerical push 
back was similarly tepid. In fact, what we hear from the clerics at the time 
is the partnership of the state and religion (din va daulat), an Islamic creed 
(with Sassanian origins) that depicted the two as siblings, two stones on 
one ring, dependent and necessary for the survival of the other.23 Further 
19 Hamid Algar, Religion and State in Iran, 1785–1906: The Role of the Ulama In the Qajar 
Period (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 3–5, 242–56. This view does not 
find support even in the more religiously inclined studies of the constitutional movement 
in Iran. See Vanessa Martin, Islam and Modernism: The Iranian Revolution of 1906 (Lon-
don: I. B. Tauris, 1989), 33, 64.
20 Algar, Religion and State, 11–12.
21 Algar, 12–13 (quote is from p. 13).
22 Algar, 128, 169–71, 223–24.
23 As the king states in the 6th-century Letter of Tansar: 
 Do not marvel at my zeal and ardour for promoting order in the world so that the 
foundations of the laws of Faith may be made firm. For Church and State were born 
from one womb, joined together, never to be sundered. Virtue and corruption, health 
and sickness, are of the same nature for both (The Letter of Tansar, trans. M. Boyce 
(Rome: Instituto Italiano Per Il Medio Ed Estremo Oriente, 1968), 33–34).
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assumed was the subservience of religion to the state/king, as Kingship 
survived with irreligion, but not with injustice.24 Historically, many Islam-
icate polities and certainly Iran and the Ottoman Empire acknowledged 
this distinction and hierarchy. Salvatore has productively referred to this as 
a “soft” distinction made between the worldly “source of norms of human 
interaction” and “the normative discourse subsumed under the notion of 
shari‘a,” a distinction made in the adab tradition. For our purposes, the 
“mirrors for princes” genre is the most relevant part of that tradition and 
we will come back to see the weight of that “soft” distinction in the course 
of the constitutional movement.25
For now, my purpose was to note that doctrinally the shi‘ite clerics of 
the late Qajar period acknowledged their subservience to the state and 
publicly announced it on multiple occasions by drawing upon the distinc-
tive language of mirrors. Furthermore, I wanted to point out that the in-
stitutional conflict between the state and religion in the late 19th century 
was not severe enough to prompt a full-scale opposition of the clerical 
rank. Yet, at the time, widespread discontent, pressures from below, and 
incentives of improved standing, provided the added impetus for clerics to 
assume a leadership role in protests. Their claims to community leadership 
and public representation and close ties to the merchants and prominent 
guilds that were reinforced through kinship or bazaar networks, amplified 
their obligations.
What was constitutionalism’s appeal in the Iranian setting? It is cru-
cial to make a distinction between various groups and what they each 
wanted as these were not the same but did overlap. For the intelli- 
gentsia, reformist statesmen, and the nascent middle class, it is tempting 
to romanticize the idea of freedom and individual rights, and, depending 
on the author’s inclinations, their fight with religion under the secular 
mantra or its opposite, their unconditional devotion to religion and sub-
servience to clerical leadership. Even if striving for individual freedoms 
was relevant at the time, it was marginal at best compared to other wants. 
The greater concern of this group was with ending patrimonialism and 
24 Nizam al-Mulk, Siyasatnamah, 6. For subservience of religion to the state in pre-Islamic 
mirrors, see ‘Ahd Ardashir, ed. Ihsan ‘Abbas, transl. and introd. Muhammad Ali Shushtari 
(Tehran: Silsilah-’i Intisharat-i Anjuman-i Asar-i Milli, 1348/1969), 70–71.
25 See Armando Salvatore, “The Islamicate Adab Tradition vs. the Islamic Shari‘a, from 
Pre-colonial to Colonial,” Working Paper Series of the HCAS “Multiple Secularities – Be-
yond the West, Beyond Modernities” 3 (Leipzig University, 2018).
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nepotism of the Qajar monarchy, adopting legal rationality, finishing of-
ficial abuse and unaccountability, and staving off colonial domination. 
Their ambitions can be subsumed under the desire for the creation of a 
strong centralized state. Given the near failure of centralizing reform in 
the previous century, this group viewed constitutionalism as a doctrine 
of modern, bureaucratic rationality capable of dealing with the myriad 
internal and external problems by means of an interventionist state. On 
the world stage, it was expected that constitutionalism would elevate 
Iran’s status through inclusion in the club of civilized nations, and by 
doing so, stave off the very real threat of colonization by Britain, or occu-
pation by Russia. The Russo-Japanese war of 1904/1905 that ended in the 
humiliating defeat and surrender of Russia at Port Arthur captured these 
hopes: the only constitutional Asian nation had brought to its knees the 
only European great power without a constitution, which also happened 
to be Iran’s neighbor, and its most fearsome foe. All this goes to indicate 
that the revolutionaries’ primary target was the Qajar state and monarchy 
for its failure to fulfill its internal and external responsibilities, and not 
the institution of religion. Yet, inevitably, given the state-centered model 
of full-scale social and political transformation envisioned by the intelli- 
gentsia, their use of Islamicized constitutionalism to attract the clerics 
and legitimize it in the public eye, raised issues with religion that needed 
to be settled in one way or another. Eventually these brought religion to 
the forefront and placed it under serious assault.
I have already recounted the clerical reasoning but what could be 
added is that clerics too had serious concern about the prospect of colonial 
domination and what they perceived as subservience of Islam to Christian 
powers. As such, they too strove for a stronger state. However, unlike the 
intelligentsia, their prescription for achieving this end was in extinguishing 
injustice, as only then would the subjects be secure, balance be preserved 
among various estates, taxes flow, and the state regain its health against 
adversity. Their vision was informed strongly by the Circle of Justice, a cen-
tral teaching of the mirrors that, in contrast to the iron-fisted, rationalized, 
interventionist state, placed the traditional monarchy at the center and the 
shah as the individual responsible for rendering justice but who had failed 
in his duties for now. They were unconcerned with the state form but de-
manded less intervention, as expressed in their repeated concern for trans-
gression of officials. Here their vision was more compatible with the guilds, 
12
whose ‘constitutionalism’ was in fact a tax revolt against covetous officials, 
governors, local rulers, and landlords at a time when they had experienced 
a downturn and were less capable of paying their traditional taxes.26
3 Constitutional Revolution as a Secularizing Event, and the  
 Contingency of the British Legation
If the constitutional movement was a grand event that could be easily di-
vided into what had gone before it and what came after, the contingency 
that made it possible was the gathering at the British Legation in Tehran. 
It was during this gathering that the lay participants became the move-
ment’s leaders as the movement slipped from the clerics’ firm grip. Until 
then, the movement had progressed under the clerical umbrella, with mass 
gatherings taking place at mosques and holy sites and demands that had a 
distinctly religious tone. The British Legation gathering opened the door 
to a full-fledged legislative assembly, and turned a familiar-sounding revolt 
into an unfamiliar revolution.
To appreciate the significance of this gathering as a contingency, we 
should note that the brief history of oppositional societies in Iran prior 
to 1906 contained nothing that compared to the organized parties of the 
Ottoman Empire like the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the 
Liberal opposition, the Armenian or Albanian political groupings, or com-
parable societies in Istanbul. In Tehran and major cities such as Tabriz, 
Isfahan, and Kirman, there were intellectual circles and gatherings interest-
ed in reform, but these were tiny and hardly revolutionary. The reformist 
publications by long-standing merchant communities in Cairo, Istanbul, 
Calcutta, and Caucasus or by critical diplomats in Europe sought funda-
mental change but not by radical means. Among these, Qanun, the jour-
nal published by Malkam Khan (1834–1908) in London that we have seen 
already, was the most influential publication of its kind. It explicitly advo-
cated constitutionalism and propagated an Islamic version.
26 Part of the reason for the guilds’ lesser ability to pay their taxes was the disruptive shock 
of global capitalism and the influx of cheaper and better European goods, especially fab-
rics. These had created a good deal of hardship and the guilds sought remedy in protests 
that over time became constitutional in nature.
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The most important grouping in Tehran was the intellectuals associated 
with the National Library who later formed the Revolutionary Committee 
and affiliated groups, each of which had well below a hundred members. 
The differences in the educational infrastructure and literacy levels in Iran 
and the Ottoman Empire were reflected in the difference in the volume 
and content of newspapers, even after accounting for Iran’s population 
being a third of that of its Ottoman neighbor. In Iran, in the absence of a 
sizable middle class and low literacy, few were familiar with constitutional 
causes. There was also nothing that resembled an armed ethnic nationalist 
movement in Iran, and the large array of ethnicities had not been politi-
cized over cultural, linguistic, ethnic, or religious differences.
4 The Revolution
After a series of small-scale acts of dissent in March and April 1905, a large 
protest took place at the Shah mosque in early December 1905. With the 
breakup of the gathering by the government, the clerical leadership and 
followers moved with a much larger crowd to take sanctuary at the holiest 
shrine in Tehran, Abdulazim in mid-December. When, after a month, the 
shah conceded to the clerical demands in order to end the sanctuary but 
then failed to follow through, tensions flared up again. In late June, in the 
course of freeing a popular preacher, many were killed, including two cler-
ics, and the protests resumed at the Jami‘ mosque. As with the earlier Shah 
mosque gathering, this was also scattered by a harsh government response. 
Finally, in mid-July 1906, as a sign of major escalation, the three most dis-
tinguished Tehran clerics took sanctuary at a prominent shi‘i site in the 
city of Qom a few days away from Tehran. Before leaving, at the encour-
agement of one of the three clerics (Bihbahani), a few merchants also took 
sanctuary at the British Legation. This location was off limits to the clerics 
themselves given the symbolism of subservience to a foreign, Christian 
state but was a place of sanctuary safe from the government clampdown 
and guaranteed to attract the government’s attention. A massive crowd fol-
lowed the clerics on foot to Qom, but the Legation gathering also grew 
to be quite large. The clerical leaders’ Great Exodus to Qom, as the move 
came to be known, opened the way for a fateful contingency. That same 
night, the merchants took sanctuary at the British Legation and were soon 
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joined by a crowd of fifteen thousand guild members, students of religion, 
merchants, and intelligentsia. Had the clerical leadership stayed put, the 
British Legation would not have been the choice, nor would the demands 
have escalated as they did.
The transformation of demands spoke a good deal about the divide 
between the clerics and the constitutionalists. During the mid-December 
assembly at Abdulazim, the clerics called for impartial implementation of 
laws of Islam, and more critically, for the creation of a House of Justice 
in every town and region to investigate public complaints and attend to 
injustices and grievances and adjudicate impartially and justly. Even if not 
stated explicitly, presumably these provincial bodies were to be staffed by a 
mix of government officials and clerics. After all, such a mix had been the 
composition of similar bodies under the Qajars and what appeared in later 
demands.
The shah agreed to Houses of Justice being established throughout 
Iran and described them as being of the highest priority for the subjects’ 
comfort and for the enforcement of religious laws. He also conceded to a 
greater role for the laws of religion in affairs of the realm. When nothing 
happened in the next few months, pressure mounted from below on the 
clerical leaders who were warned against cooptation, prompting a public 
statement that they had not been bribed. Before the three clerical leaders 
set out for Qom, one addressed a large audience in Tehran. With talk 
of constitutionalism in the air, Tabatabai assured the government in a 
public sermon that contrary to the rumors, they had no desire for such a 
system or for the more extreme republicanism. They only demanded an 
Assembly of House of Justice. The inclusion of Assembly in the appella-
tion – a new development – was somewhat significant, but more import-
ant was the explicit denial of constitutionalist leanings. When the clerics 
issued their long list of demands from Qom, they spoke of an Assembly 
(no longer a House) of Justice that enforced shari‘a in many spheres to set 
matters right, in short “Islamic goals that strengthened the Islamic mon-
archy.” The Assembly’s stated membership was broader yet solidly elitist 
and inclusive of government officials but it appeared far from a legislative 
body.27 The gathering in Tehran established a new negotiation venue, and 
with the start of three-way exchanges between the government, Qom, and 
27 Its expanded responsibilities included putting an end to the transgressions and tyranny 
of government officials and their neglect in the execution of religious laws; to the spread 
15
the Legation in the capital, the latter progressively overshadowed Qom. 
Not only were the clerical leaders in Qom physically removed from the 
center of power, but the gathering at the Legation gave the impression of 
British backing. The first proposal by the shah was promptly ignored, but 
his second offer instead of addressing the clerics at Qom was dispatched 
for approval to the Tehran gathering that continued to make more strin-
gent demands than the light ones coming from Qom. By mentioning an 
Assembly (not a house) that was to operate in Tehran alone and not the 
provinces, the government’s second offer inched closer to the calls ema-
nating from the Legation in the form of leaflets and by other means. But its 
insistence on the future body’s subservience to the shah without the shah 
being obliged to carry out the body’s rulings made it utterly unacceptable 
to the intelligentsia who, in the absence of clerical leaders, had come to 
dominate the negotiations and demanded nothing less than a constitution 
and a parliament. When the government came back with a better offer (5 
August), despite having a broader popular membership (not yet a fran-
chise) and having excluded government officials, it was rejected for not 
mentioning legislative functions and appearing to be an advisory coun-
cil. Additionally, the decree had explicitly and entirely left the drawing up 
of the assembly’s regulations to the shah. The next government offer (7 
August) was not persuasive either. It referred to the “Islamic Consultative 
Assembly” that was given the right to approve its own internal regulations 
before ratification by the shah. Obviously, the government’s scramble to 
contain the demands within the official discourse of the previous half 
of abominable crimes; and to the committing of acts forbidden by religion. These were 
considered Islamic goals that strengthened the Islamic monarchy, removed foreign influ-
ences, and forbade the occupation of the land of Iran. The Assembly of Justice was to be 
staffed by a group of ministers and high officials, merchants, clerics, the wise and learned, 
and notables. Its members acted as the shah’s trustees under the supervision and leader-
ship of the kind and benevolent shah of Islam. They were entrusted with the responsibil-
ity to govern and supervise all state offices and determine their rights, responsibilities, 
and duties; to rectify defects in internal and external affairs, finances, and the municipal-
ity; to enjoin good and prohibit evil according to the holy law; and to arrange domestic 
and foreign contracts, reciprocation, and transactions according to laws of Islam; assign 
dues and taxes, and arrange their registers; administer justice for the oppressed and pun-
ish violators; and rectify the affairs of Muslims according to the holy law of Islam and the 
precepts of shar`, the official law of the monarchy and the “nation.” The clerics were firm 
on their right to draw up the assembly’s internal regulations (kitabchah va nizamnamah’i 
dakhalah). Clearly surpassing the House of Justice, this was not intended to be a legisla-
tive assembly and resembled more an official consultative body with wide responsibilities 
and executive functions.
16
century and to trivialize them by pretending to their familiarity was fail-
ing. The government hoped at most for a Europe-inspired, non-represen-
tative, subservient consultative council in place of a legislative, sovereign 
body, and even called it Islamic to appease the clerics and mitigate its 
threat. Yet, this was unacceptable to the Tehran protesters as they made 
clear when their delegation, accompanied by the British chargé d’affaires, 
met with the chief minister (8 August) to demand the immediate estab-
lishment of the National, and not the Islamic, Consultative Assembly. 
The chief minister insisted on the Islamic character and staunchly op-
posed a national one but was finally forced to back down, especially after 
being threatened with the coming disorder of the “nation.” The final decree 
(9 August) contained a significant victory for Tehran when “Islamic 
Consultative Assembly” was replaced with “National Consultative As-
sembly.” The representatives reserved the right to approve regulations 
and arrangements (niẓāmnāmah-i tartībāt) – what later came to be the 
constitution itself – but it was still the chief vizier who drew them up 
in the latest agreement. The assembly was to act as the guardian of the 
shah’s justice (nigahbān-i ‘adl-i mā), start necessary reforms, and imple-
ment the sacred shari‘a laws. In the end, a small intellectual clique with 
little social clout had exerted inordinate influence. The celebrations that 
ensued gave rise to the belief that the constitutional era had begun, even 
though the decree had made no mention of a legislative body. The Tehran 
crowd acted and celebrated as if the constitutional era was now an estab-
lished fact. This was only the beginning of the fight over the meaning and 
responsibilities of the Assembly.
The crucial compromise opened the way for a full-fledged legislative 
assembly, and the writing of a timid constitution, followed by a thorough, 
radical Supplement based primarily on the Belgian and secondarily on the 
French (1791), Bulgarian, and Ottoman constitutions.28 The Supplement 
endowed the legislature with superior powers over the executive and dras-
tically diminished monarchical authority. Its approach to religion was also 
entirely secular at the inception but it was forced into a number of compro-
mises that were in any event unacceptable to the conservatives. Its approach 
to taxes in favor of common folk and the guilds enraged the monarchy, 
the governors, the elite, the rulers and landowners throughout the land 
28 Janet Afary, “Civil Liberties and the Making of Iran’s First Constitution,” Comparative 
Studies of South Asia, Africa, and the Middle East 25, no. 2 (2005).
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and became the chief cause of its troubles. It also provided an opportunity 
for the opposition to the Assembly to unite under the guise of religion and 
start a bloody civil war. The question is how did the Assembly, without 
backing from the state or army manage to antagonize every established 
institution for two years and survive the counter-revolution after a year of 
intense fighting?
The answer is found in the proliferation of armed popular commit-
tees throughout Iran. After the shah’s 9 August decree, a crucial period 
of political opening followed in Iran that accompanies all revolutions at 
least for a short while. Aside from the committees (anjumans), this period 
witnessed the proliferation of societies of all kinds. In Tehran alone they 
numbered between 110 and 140, with the largest one having around 3,000 
members. The Young Turks had received solid support from the military 
that sustained the Chamber of Deputies, and 1905 Russia had the zemstvos 
and the budding Soviets that were ultimately not enough to protect the 
Duma from a legal counter-revolution that disempowered it. In Iran there 
were the committees. Given the weakness of the Iranian army, the com-
mittees played a balancing role, sustaining the Assembly. We do not know 
exactly where they came from and why they proliferated so rapidly, but 
their appearance certainly pointed to a wide level of discontent that had 
been recounted in the reformist literature of the last quarter century. That 
they were predominantly staffed by the guild members, suggests an affinity 
with guild associations. Once the Assembly recognized their usefulness 
in confronting the monarchy, it nurtured closer ties with them and took 
the unusual step of legally granting them many state-like functions in the 
provinces such as tax collection, public works, and supervision of local 
governments in one of its most detailed pieces of legislation (32 pages). 
Acting as an extra-parliamentarian enforcer, the Assembly used the com-
mittees to intimidate the government, pass sweeping tax legislation, and 
even start to implement it. Over time, the committees became the biggest 
thorn in the side of the local governments and the monarchy. As would 
be expected, the popular committees did not function as one disciplined 
body. Animated by popular justice, the hundreds of boisterous committees 
had difficulty coordinating action amongst themselves, let alone with the 
Assembly. Nonetheless, a national organization of committees was in the 
making that looked up to the Assembly as a savior from harsh and erratic 
taxation and day-to-day injustices. That committees were the reason why 
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the Assembly had any clout was beyond doubt, but their proclivity to create 
chaos was also cause for concern.29
5 Iranian Constitutionalism: The Blending and Unblending of Three  
 Traditions
The committees in Tehran physically protected the Assembly by setting up 
headquarters next door. Throughout Iran, the committees’ frequent armed 
presence exuded a sense of empowerment against those they perceived as 
oppressors. The committees operated daily as a Council of Grievances or 
a House of Justice, and in fact viewed the Assembly as something resem-
bling a chief House of Justice and the ultimate center of recourse. In Tabriz, 
for example, where the committee had its own newspapers that showed 
its inner workings, the city’s inhabitants brought concerns to the commit-
tee meetings that were open to the public, a practice that was emulated in 
smaller cities and towns in Azerbaijan. The members, almost invariably in 
sympathy with the aggrieved, made deliberations in public that resulted 
in reaching out to the relevant officials like the governor. In cases where 
the issue could not be resolved locally, they telegrammed the Assembly 
petition office that in turn decided which ministry was to be contacted 
(usually Interior or Finance) and pressed for its resolution. This encour-
aged the ministries to engage with local government in order to reach a 
resolution, with results communicated back to the Assembly that then 
contacted the committees. In some instances, prominent representatives 
would themselves assume ministerial positions, such as when the head of 
the Assembly Sani‘ al-Dawla became the Minister of Interior in which case 
the committees found a sympathetic ear at the highest levels of govern-
ment. Of these petitions, telegrams of greater consequence were read out 
loud in the general Assembly meetings. The description by some historians 
of committees as an autonomous government within the government of 
Tabriz, or Rasht, is certainly accurate. Their sense of ‘moral economy’ was 
29 Faridun Adamiyat, Idi’uluzhi-i Nahzat-i Mashrutiyat-i Iran, vol. 2 (Tehran: Intisharat-i 
Rushangaran, 2000); Nader Sohrabi, Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman 
Empire and Iran (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011); Janet Afary, The Irani-
an Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911: Grassroots Democracy, Social Democracy, and 
the Origins of Feminism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996).
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evident throughout Iran as can be seen in price-setting for essential com-
modities (esp. bread), anti-hoarding activities, and, most importantly, ef-
forts to moderate taxes.30
A House of Justice with branches throughout Iran to attend to public 
grievances was what the clerics had demanded in mid-December at their 
gathering in Abdulazim in their first expression of substance. In that sense, 
the guilds and the public were more attuned to clerical demands than the 
single full-fledged legislative Assembly desired by the intelligentsia. Ironi-
cally, however, this new arrangement ended up empowering the legislative 
Assembly in Tehran at the expense of the clerics and was thus a turn to-
ward secularism and secularity. To fully appreciate this turn, we need to 
take note of three different traditions brought together to make this setup a 
possibility, namely the Islamic, the pre-Islamic, and the Western traditions.
Petitioning the source of justice, or the king, for the redress of griev- 
ances was part of the tradition of the Circle of Justice, the history of which 
long predates Islam in the Middle East though it is most strongly associat-
ed with the pre-Islamic Sassanian Iran in its Islamic rendition.31 With the 
spread of Islam, the concept became an integral part of the Islamic tradi-
tion, and petitioning became associated with the dīvān-i maẓālim. How-
ever, a soft distinction continued to remain between the two traditions 
and some contradictory notions were preserved, such as the idea of di-
vine kingship as expressed in the Islamic concept of Shadow of God Upon 
Earth. Recourse to the source of justice through direct petitioning of the 
shah was one way the public satisfied their search for justice through for-
mal channels, in addition to recourse to the courts, whether shar‘ī or ‘urf. 
As Darling notes, most maẓālim cases dealt with issues beyond the pur-
view of Islamic law, like “taxation or official injustice.”32 Some others have 
gone so far as to call the “maẓālim” institution a secular form of justice 
for Islam in general, or for Safavid Iran in particular.33 Yet, as Darling and 
30 Edward P. Thompson, “The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth 
Century,” chap. 5 in Customs in Common: Studies in Traditional Popular Culture (New 
York: New Press, 1993); see also James C. Scott, Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of 
Peasant Resistance (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1985).
31 For one of the most ambitious genealogies of this concept see Linda T. Darling, A History 
of Social Justice and Political Power in the Middle East: The Circle of Justice From Mesopo-
tamia to Globalization (London: Routledge, 2013).
32 Darling, Social Justice, 79.
33 Irene Schneider, The Petitioning System in Iran: State, Society and Power Relations in the 
Late 19th Century (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006), 24–25, 29–30, 84. Schneider bases 
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Schneider have noted, this was only a tendency, and shari‘a was not far 
off, Islamic judges were sometimes incorporated into the institution and 
consulted, and shari‘a invoked and enforced in relation to the cases. Thus, 
the necessity of speaking of a soft distinction. Indeed, based on the lim-
ited number of petitions Schneider studied for late 19th-century Iran, she 
concludes that the mazalim’s “legitimacy rested on its respect for shari‘a.”34
The absence of a hard distinction between the two traditions, that is 
kingly justice and shari‘a, is also apparent when we look back at the early 
clerical demands at the start of the movement. Not only did they ask for a 
House of Justice with branches throughout Iran, they also called for clerical 
representation in them with the aim of implementing shari‘a more firmly.
With the setting up of the Assembly that eventually resembled a 
Western-style legislative parliament, several things happened that put 
pressure on the institution of kingship and on the clerical establishment, 
but also chipped away at the Assembly’s Western posture. Much to the 
dismay of many Western-style parliamentarians, the public flooded the 
Assembly with petitions. The Westernist constitutionalists did not see 
dealing with them as part of their task partly because some were trivial 
and arrived from the remotest locations, but also because they wanted 
to disparage their image as a House of Justice, or a court of maẓālim. 
Their pleas to the public to stop petitioning the legislature were of no 
use, and eventually, given the support they needed from the committees, 
the Assembly came to embrace them and assigned a separate petition 
committee to handle them.
The challenge to the monarchy came from two directions: to be sure, the 
Western-style parliament and constitution limited the monarchical powers 
and added strict conditions for its legitimacy, but legitimacy was also under 
threat from the traditional angle. The public petitioning of the Assembly for 
justice in place of the shah called his traditional role into question.
Petitioning through independent channels was also a challenge to the 
clerical claim of community leadership as the clerics witnessed their in-
formal networks being supplanted in this novel context. The committees 
her discussion on J.S. Nielsen Secular Justice in an Islamic State: Maẓālim Under the Baḥrī 
Mamlūks, 662/1264-789/1387 (Istanbul: Nederlands Historisch-Archaeologisch Institu-
ut te Istanbul, 1985) and Willem Floor, “The Secular Judicial System in Safavid Persia,” 
Studia Iranica 29, no. 1 (2000).
34 Schneider, Petitioning System, 83.
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that sprang up throughout Iran functioned partly as houses of justice. With 
their direct links to the source of justice, in this case the Assembly, they 
were no longer in dire need of clerical representation. Martin, elaborating 
on Algar’s earlier thesis, has documented the role clerics played in bro- 
kering compromises between the state and the public, a bargaining process 
that was routine outside the rare instances of rebellion. Importantly, she 
points to clerical participation in the few Houses of Justice established late 
in the 19th century.35 Now, however, the public in its own name and in an 
unmediated negotiation path with the state, had reduced its need for cleri-
cal mediation over taxes and other injustices, which became something of 
a challenge to the clerics.
Of course, there was variation, still informed by the soft distinction. 
In Burujird, Turbat Haidariyah, Shushtar, and, undoubtedly in other loca-
tions, the committees were under clerical leadership.36 Even in places like 
Isfahan, where clerics played an important role, some petitions were rife 
with Islamic imagery with references to shar‘, the Islamic public, and a dis-
tinctively Islamic tone that bore the stamp of clerical prose.37 And in Tabriz, 
out of the three seats assigned to the petition council of the committee, one 
was specifically reserved for a cleric. Furthermore, clerical assistance from 
outside the committees was still sought, and when pleading for the clerics’ 
help, a distinctively religious tone was adopted.38 In short, communication 
through committee newspapers, anonymous leaflets, and, especially, peti-
tions did not become devoid of religious language, and their members did 
not become any less religious. Yet, petitioning through committees became 
by far the most prevalent means of recourse to justice with subjects almost 
exclusively confined to matters of state like high taxes, predatory gover-
nors, rulers, local officials, extortion by landowners and tribes, the manner 
35 Vanessa Martin, The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest, and the State in 19th-Century Persia 
(London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 4, 18–21, 42–43. For the House of Justice in Fars in the 1890s 
and clerical involvement, see Martin, 63–67. It should be noted that Martin, without explic-
itly invoking the Circle of Justice, views it as a thoroughly Islamicized concept and consid-
ers all legal matters and notions of legitimacy as subservient to shari‘a, portrayed here as a 
total system. Hence, no room is left for even a soft distinction between multiple, contradic-
tory, and sometimes conflicting legal-political-cultural patterns. See Martin, 8–16.
36 Mas‘ud Kuhistaninejad, Guzidah-i asnad va anjumanha-yi iyalati va vilayati (Tehran: Ki-
tabkhanah, Muze va Markaz-i Asnad-i Majlis-i Shura-yi Islami, 2011/1390), 52.
37 See, for example, the telegram from the committee in Isfahan; Kuhistaninejad, asnad va 
anjumanha, 257–59.
38 See, for example, the telegram from the Tabriz or Ardabil committees; Kuhistaninejad, 
5–7, 30–34.
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and locations in which the taxes were spent, commodity prices, harsh pun-
ishments, coercion and the like. As such, the content was of less relevance 
to that covered by religious laws and more in line with matters of the state. 
The committees now acted as public representatives and became places 
for gatherings of the common folk who had found their own communica-
tion channel with the legislature and the state, energized by the sense that 
the old administration of justice had broken down. The language of peti-
tions came to differ from the religiously laden language of protests when it 
moved through the mobilization channels of the clerics, and there was less 
need for clerical involvement with the public’s new-found organizations.
The soft distinction was hardening. Even the legislation that made the 
committees official stated in a clause that, until the creation of the new 
state judicial administration, the official committees could act as courts of 
appeal for the decisions of ‘urf courts. This was a shift that may be charac-
terized as secularity; not antagonism to religion, but a move away from the 
clerical patronage now that other, more effective, ways of communicating 
and acting on wants had been found. Yet, the matter did not stop there. 
Against the Assembly’s explicitly secularist agenda, only a fraction of the 
committees defected, with the great majority standing firmly behind the 
Assembly. Even beyond that, the committees remained a vital tool for the 
fight with the monarchy and a gathering counter-revolution that became 
overly concerned with religion.
Another important transformation was at work here with the emer-
gence of committees and their continued practice of petitioning. There was 
a difference between the old practice of petitioning that took place within 
the established rules of the game, that is absolute deference of subjects to 
authority in search of redress of individual wants, or even the collective 
wants of a village, guilds, or a section of city inhabitants. The sociologist 
Zaret terms the traditional format “petition and response,” distinct from 
the later form of petitioning that he names “liminal petitioning” where pe-
titioning is no longer an instrument of state and a mechanism for repro-
ducing its legitimacy, but one that is used as an “instrument of insurgency.” 
Here we see deference and defiance at the same time, and a format and 
language that is something between the humble request of subjects and 
demands based on rights.39 The committees’ widespread reach as a 
39 David Zaret, “Petition-and-Response and Liminal Petitioning in Comparative/Historical 
Perspective,” Social Science History 43, no. 3 (2019).
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burgeoning national network that was sometimes coupled with their own 
press, signaled the early stages of the rise of public opinion and a secu-
lar public sphere in the Iranian context at the grass-roots level. This went 
beyond the elite or the middle-class city dwellers with their own modern 
presses, associations, and now a parliament. However, it is also important 
to note that despite their differences, the two were not at all independent 
and pulled together and grew in tandem.
6 Counter-Revolution and the Language of Religion
Counterrevolutions that erupted in Iran (1908–1909) and the Ottoman 
Empire (1909) were responses to the changes effected by the new regimes. 
Both revolutions had pursued greater centralization, uniformity, and ratio-
nalization in broad terms, even if the precise contents differed. In Iran, tax 
overhaul preoccupied the Assembly and was brought to the brink of collapse 
because of it.40
The religious opposition, liberal or conservative, had initially rallied 
against the Qajar monarchy but, as time went by, their differences with 
constitutionalists became increasingly clear. The religious establishment 
defined justice as limits placed on government interference in public life 
and the safeguarding of an autonomous domain regulated by religious law 
under clerical influence. As such the clerics did not suggest a fundamen-
tally different mode of governance, but a less intrusive and extractive one. 
Theirs was a local definition of justice. In stark contrast, the constitution-
alists’ ideal of justice was shaped by a regulative, legal-rational centralized 
state with more intense involvement in public life than anything seen be-
fore. Theirs was a global definition of justice.
In short, if the clerics sought less state and were oblivious to its orga-
nizational structure, the constitutionalists strove for one that transformed 
the taxation structure, managed and improved citizens’ welfare in accord 
with global norms, put into effect and enforced the laws systematically 
and acted as its sole arbiter, took responsibility for public education, and 
40 Ending the land income category tuyul enraged the powerful tuyul holders. At the same 
time, endowing the central government with the authority to dictate, collect, and distrib-
ute both components of provincial taxes – amalkard and tafavut-i amal meant taking 
control of provincial budgets that infuriated the governors and local magnates.
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enhanced geopolitical standing through military reorganization to with-
stand colonization.
Their contrasting visions came to a head during the passage of the 
Supplement, or the real constitution, which placed the Assembly and the 
committees on the one hand against the monarchy and the conservative 
clerics on the other. The Qajar monarchy, already incensed at the Assem-
bly’s tax policies, detested the Supplement. Its tripartite division of powers 
put a definitive end to government as the extension of shah’s patrimonial 
household; not only did it limit monarchical powers but it endowed the 
legislature with superior powers over the executive that was now clearly 
distinguished from the monarchy. The conservative clerics were equally 
fearful of the Supplement, and for good reason. The handwritten drafts 
that have recently come to light show that originally it had made no men-
tion of religious courts, and by bringing (compulsory) education solely 
under state supervision, it managed to undermine the institutional pillars 
of the clerical establishment.41 The conservatives also took issue with the 
heavy borrowings from European constitutions and, beyond that, with the 
Assembly’s pretense to law-making through lay individuals. Other conten-
tious topics were freedom of expression and the press, equality of all before 
the law regardless of religion, and, finally, the locus of sovereignty.
To oppose the Supplement, the conservative clerics relived the drama 
of earlier days and took sanctuary at Tehran’s holiest site (Abdulazim). In 
their newly firmed up alliance with the monarchy, they now referred to 
it as the Islamic government. Such a usage was not new, but its consis-
tent invocation was a show of support for a threatened ally, the monarchy, 
against their common foe, the Assembly. From there, they cried “decep-
tion” and blamed their mistake on the sweet words and attractive language 
that had served to conceal the obscenity and hideousness of what the con-
stitutionalists had learned in the schools of Vienna and Paris. According 
to them, equality (musāvat) could not mean equality of all religions and 
creeds before the law, but that of Muslims alone, and, furthermore, by cit-
ing liberty (āzādī), the Assembly had no right to pass laws on freedom of 
opinion or speech; the Assembly, and the slogans “liberty,” “equality,” and 
“fraternity” were clothes cut for a European figure and, for the most part, in 
contradiction with the holy law. They expressed anger at the change from 
41 For two early drafts of the Supplement see Iraj Afshar, ed., Qabalah-’i Tarikh (Tehran: 
Talayah, 1989), Doc. 67, 91–100.
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‘Islamic Consultative Assembly’ to the ‘National Consultative Assembly’ at 
the request of the British Legation gathering against the shah’s wish. In a 
similar vein, they protested the change of the clerics’ original demand from 
an Assembly of Justice (majlis-i ma‘dalat), intended to implement the laws 
of religion, to the National Consultative Assembly and a constitution. For 
them, these were unfamiliar words and concepts that again had originated 
from the British Legation gathering. In the clerics’ opinion, the Assembly 
was the Islamic Consultative Assembly, established by the efforts of the 
Islamic clergy, for service and assistance to the court of the Islamic gov-
ernment and the preservation of the rights of followers of shi‘ism. As such, 
it should not have been influenced by the French or British parliaments.
The celebrations of the first anniversary of the constitution in late July 
1907 were held up repeatedly as proof of anti-Islamic and alien behavior. On 
those nights, purportedly, the constitutionalists had so extended the mean-
ing of equality (musāvat) that it had enabled all nationalities and religions, 
foreign or native, Jews and Christians, European men and women, and espe-
cially Babis and naturalists, to congregate in one place. At the celebrations, 
the Europeans had congratulated the clerics by shaking hands with them 
while uttering “long live liberty and the constitution.” Above the entrance, 
a banner had read “long live fraternity and equality,” and during the cere-
monies they had all sung “long live the Zoroastrians.” Particularly blamed 
were the heretic Babis and naturalists, those responsible for eliminating “Is-
lamic” from the Assembly’s name, expanding the meaning of freedom so 
that women could dress as men and walk freely in the streets or bazaars, 
and holding Galileo, Newton, Kepler, Hugo, and Rousseau in higher regard 
than the clergy or prophets. The constitutionalists were further accused of 
contaminating young children’s minds in their modern schools and convert-
ing them to naturalism. Their European eyeglasses, walking sticks, pants, 
top hats, frocks, and habit of urinating upright were also mocked. With the 
establishment of the Assembly, the conservative clerics held, it was probable 
that they were reaching the end of the age of clerical leadership and the over-
throw of the state of Islam, after which absolute freedom would be in vogue, 
the proscribed allowed, intoxicants permitted, narcotics explored, the holy 
law annulled, and the Qur’an forsaken. The conservative clerics were in full 
agreement with this paper’s view of contingency and agency presented at the 
beginning: the intelligentsia’s move to the Legation in the absence of clerics 
had transformed demands into far-reaching constitutional ones.
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These developments divided the clerical ranks. With stern opposition 
led by Ayatollah Nuri, some like Ayatollah Bihbahani grew distant and quiet 
while others, most prominently Ayatollah Tabatabai, became more vocal in 
denouncing Nuri and his conservative camp. In this he was helped by a mi-
nority faction of clerics in Iraq around Na’ini who developed a Shia defense 
of constitutionalism.42 Also, many among the lower-ranking clerics with 
guild ties remained steadfast in their support.
The ongoing posturing over the Supplement intensified the constitution-
al and extra-constitutional battles in 1907. The Assembly radicalized and 
became harsher in its criticisms of the government and monarchy and the 
committees around the country stepped up their activities. In Tabriz, the 
trades, the guilds and inhabitants took sanctuary at the telegraph office in 
support of the Supplement for nearly a month. Their newspaper wrote excit-
edly of schoolchildren, who arrived in groups with their teachers and walked 
around the schoolyard singing revolutionary songs and carrying red flags; 
some youngsters had worn shrouds or adorned themselves with red signs 
to announce their readiness for martyrdom. Also, women, some cuddling 
newborns, had joined men in mosques to demand the drafting of the Sup-
plement. Telegraph offices in Rasht, Anzali, Isfahan, Shiraz, and other cities 
witnessed similar gatherings by crowds demanding the passage of the Sup-
plement. When telegrams in solidarity and sympathy from various national 
protest sites were read out to the crowd in Tabriz, they yelled in unison “long 
live our brave compatriots, long live constitutionalists and the constitution-
al government of Iran.” Before the start of their month-long sanctuary, the 
crowds in Tabriz had asked the Assembly about the reasons for the delay 
in approving the Supplement. The Assembly, caught between the radical 
committees and the onslaught of the conservative clergy, had disingenuously 
responded that the delay was caused by precautionary measures to detect 
the slightest deviations in the Supplement from the laws of religion. Against 
this unsatisfactory answer, the protestors asked, “has the nation demanded 
religious and prayer laws from the state for there to be need for religious dis-
cussions?” They added, “we [only] demand constitutional monarchical laws 
prevalent among all constitutional nations.” Joining and defending the pro-
testers at the site, the well-known cleric Thaqat al-Islam announced that they 
did not intend to create a new religious law or to revoke the old one and that 
42 Abdul-Hadi Hairi, Shi’ism and Constitutionalism.
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no one but the clerics could concern themselves with the laws of religion.43 
Yet privately, despite his stellar constitutionalist credentials, Thaqat al-Islam 
almost resented regular obligatory visits to the telegraph office and the 
riotous atmosphere there. This he blamed on the committees, the ordinary 
public, and all types of tradespeople, which he disparaged as an ignorant 
lot. He partly blamed the chaos on the ‘anarchists,’ that is the revolutionaries 
pouring in from the Russian Caucasus, but placed the blame squarely on the 
shoulders of the local public and the tradespeople who had taken matters 
into their own hands and dared, with ready excuses, to confiscate guns from 
the royal artillery. However, he still managed to heap ridicule on the conser-
vative clerics in his quintessentially Islamic interpretation of constitution-
alism: constitutionalism only limited the authority of the government and 
the monarch, and if limiting injustice and transgression was against shar‘, 
he added ironically, then one is forced to conclude that religion sanctioned 
injustice!44
43 Anjuman, no. 84, 20 May 1907/7 Rabi‘ II 1325, 1–2. The following example comes from 
the equally contentious city of Anzali:
 Gilan had shut down for three days. In Rasht and Anzali the bazaars and shops 
were closed and most people of Anzali and its environs came to the city, took sanc-
tuary at the telegraph office, and raised the cries of “Oh constitution”, “Oh laws”, 
“Oh ratification”, “Oh implementation” to the heavens. The group of Mujahidin 
and Fada’iyan, whose numbers were many, put on military attire, paraded in the 
city and performed military drills in the compound of the telegraph office. Peo-
ple from the surrounding areas entered the compounds in companies carrying red 
banners. The students paced the compound with red banners and delivered lengthy 
speeches. The notables, the clergy, and others also came to the telegraph office and 
sent telegraphic petitions (‘arizah-yi tiligrafi) to the Assembly and to His Majesty in 
Tehran, persistently demanding and requesting the completion of the constitution, 
ratification of other laws, and their implementation. There was a marvelous com-
motion until yesterday afternoon, the 20th of the present month, an answer came 
from Tehran indicating that in a week’s time all matters will be rectified and [the 
Supplement] ratified. However, the Fada’iyan were still not content with this an-
swer and left the telegraph office in their military uniforms and headed for Rasht to 
join the Fada’iyan there so that they might devise a plan for ratification and imple-
mentation of laws. They were not convinced by the courtiers’ threats and promises. 
By whatever means at hand, they were returned half way and given assurances of 
Tehran’s telegraphic reply. Today the shops in the bazaar are open and people are at-
tending to their own businesses. Also, the customs administration, which had been 
prevented from business by the public and Fada’iyan, has started to operate today. 
God willing, all affairs will be rectified soon and the municipal and provincial pro-
tocols arrive so that the duties of every social rank will be specified and the public 
can rest in comfort (Habl al-Matin, no. 16, 16 May 1907/3 Rabi‘ II 1325, 3–4).
44 Iraj Afshar, ed., Namah-hayi Tabriz: Az Thaqat al-Islam bih Mustashar al-Dawlah (Teh-
ran: Farzan, 1999), 8–10.
28
The building crisis led to a scramble to avert further escalation. The As-
sembly after taking a harsh stance on Nuri and his associates at the start, 
reverted to a policy of appeasement and introduced compromises in the Sup-
plement. Not everyone was in a compromising mood, however. The radical 
press, the anonymous leaflets and the majority of committees only hardened 
their stance. A leaflet from the Iranian Mujahidin of Caucasus, for example, 
asked the conservative clerics why they insisted on approving the laws now 
and not back during the reign of tyranny. Were the crimes of the regime of 
tyranny according to shar‘, it asked, and invited them to be silent for other- 
wise it could only bring condemnation of past inactivity and misdeeds.45 The 
newspaper, Sur-i Israfil, began to openly disparage religion. It created an up-
roar in the capital when it alluded to Islam as nothing but old fogeyism, say-
ing Islam had created superstition among the Iranian people, and that it was 
the cause of Iran’s backwardness. The clergy interpreted the adjective used to 
describe them – kuhnah-parast (old fogey, literally worshipper of the arcane) 
– to mean that clerics worshiped the arcane – that is, Islam; they thus con-
cluded that in Sur-i Israfil’s opinion, Islam, like all matters arcane, should be 
discarded. Sur-i Israfil did not relent and dared to associate the pre-Islamic 
past with the height of Iranian civilization (hence the clerics’ sensitivity to 
Zoroastrians and Zoroastrianism), an argument that was articulated late in 
the 19th century with the emergence of modern Iranian nationalism. This 
thinking gathered momentum in the context of the fight with clerics and left 
an indelible mark on the later generations’ nationalist discourse.46 Musavat, 
a radical newspaper that had begun publication shortly after the ratification 
of the Supplement (13 October 1907), likened the clerics to advocates of idol 
worship and described them as ignorant, dishonest, intolerant, self-interested 
cheats, worshippers of tyranny, and the devil in men’s skins. It attacked their 
45 Khanah-i Mashrutiyat Archives, Tabriz 1193, Internal Center (Tabriz) of Iranian Mujahi-
din of Caucasus.
46 The same issue argued that the doctrine of natural rights may be found in the Qur’an, but 
that the clergy had not understood it and failed to talk about freedom. Sur-i Israfil, no. 12, 
4 September 1907/26 Rajab 1325: 1–3; Sur-i Israfil, no. 13, 11 September 1907/3 Sha‘bān 
1325: 1–3; Sur-i Israfil, no. 14, 18 September 1907/10 Sha‘bān 1325: 1–5. As Mottahe-
deh has argued, Iranians had for centuries drawn equally from pre-Islamic and Islamic 
imagery. In the late 19th century, however, an emerging nationalist discourse juxtaposed 
the ‘Iranian’ against the ‘Islamic’ at the expense of the latter. See Roy P. Mottahedeh, The 
Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran (New York: Pantheon Press, 1985). The 
second series of the newspaper Kaveh published in Berlin reflected some of the central 
constitutionalist writings on this, including Taqizadah, who played a key role in further 
articulating that discourse.
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wealth, their opportunism, and their political power. And finally, it argued 
that the history of Islam in the East and West demonstrated that the clergy 
had destroyed the true, democratic Islam by cooperating with tyranny and 
giving birth to a political system that was a mixture of Oriental despotism 
and American slavery.47
The committees’ most dramatic act during the battle over the Supple-
ment was the assassination of Chief Vizier Mirza Ali Asghar Khan Atabak 
(1858–1907), at the end of August. This was an event saturated with sym-
bolism. It resembled a ritual killing that destabilized the monarchy at a 
more abstract cultural level and proved to be a turning point for the move-
ment. The Supplement that was approved amidst turmoil some five weeks 
later – in early October 1907 – granted unusual powers to the legislature 
over individual ministers and the cabinet, as these were obliged to resign 
in case of dissatisfaction by the absolute majority in the Upper or Lower 
House even without legal infraction or consent of the shah (Art. 67). Al-
though additional articles moderated these powers, it certainly spoke vol-
umes about the Supplement’s vision of the Assembly’s place.
As mentioned above, the Assembly was forced to modify some articles 
of the Supplement or make new additions (see the appendix). The earlier 
draft was a thoroughly secular document, that made all citizens, regardless 
of religion, equal before the law.48 This article was not compromised and 
remained intact in the Supplement (Art. 8). The original draft had under-
mined almost entirely the institutional basis of the clerics by avoiding any 
mention of religious courts; it also made education free, mandatory, and 
under state control and supervision (Art. 19). By doing so, it ended the 
clerics’ near monopoly. The Supplement did not make a serious compro-
mise in these spheres either and left education as before. When it came to 
religious courts, of the 19 articles devoted to the courts specifically, one 
article vaguely referred to Islamic jurists being responsible for matters fall-
ing within the scope of shari‘a (Art. 71), and another (Art. 83) stated that 
the Public Prosecutor who was appointed by the shah should receive the 
approval of the ecclesiastic judge.49 More serious compromise came with 
47 Musavat, no. 2, 27 October 1907: 1–2; Musavat, no. 3, 4 November 1907: 3–5; Musavat, 
no. 5, 18 November 1907: 7–8; Musavat, no. 18, 22 March 1908; Musavat, no. 27, 30 Jan-
uary 1909: 2–5; Musavat, no. 29, 22 February 1909; Musavat, no. 30: 5.
48 See Afshar Qabalah-’i Tarikh, Doc. 67, 91–100.
49 Another mention was also made in the second clause of Article 27 that was essentially a 
repetition of Article 71. After stating that religious and civil courts were responsible for 
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freedom of the press that made exceptions for “heretical books and matters 
hurtful to the perspicuous religion [of Islam]” (Art. 20). Exception was also 
made with regard to the study and acquisition of skills in matters forbidden 
by religious law (Art. 18). Of the most serious concessions, two concerned 
religion, and one the monarchy. Islam now became the official religion of 
Iran (Art.1). Furthermore, the conservatives had demanded supervision 
of the Assembly’s law-making to ensure its compatibility with Islamic law 
and suggested a five-member clerical council with the authority to reject 
the legislative bills, something the press mocked as a clerical senate. Under 
pressure, the Assembly caved in but insisted on having the right to elect the 
five from a roster of twenty selected by the clerical establishment. Conser-
vatives rejected the offer, considering the lay representatives unfit to make 
that decision and thus shut the door to a compromise. Nonetheless, the 
Assembly’s offer found its way into the Supplement (Art. 2). Although it 
was not implemented under the Qajars or Pahlavis, it served as the model 
for various bodies in the Islamic Republic that tempered legislation and the 
national sovereignty principle in favor of religion and clerical power. With 
regard to the monarchy, its divine pretentions were awkwardly preserved 
by stating that “Kingship (Sultanate) is a trust confided as a Divine gift by 
the people to the person of the King” (Art. 35).50 This article was appar-
ently modified in the shah’s own handwriting. Yet, the Supplement was 
explicit about the locus of sovereignty: it rested with the people (Art. 26).
Just as some groups, including some trades, guilds, and committees, 
rallied behind the conservative clerics and adopted clerical language, the 
shah, too, began to couch his criticisms of the Assembly in the language of 
religion while preparing the ground for a final assault. The conservative 
clerics returned the favor by addressing him consistently as the shah of 
Islam. In their hardening stance, Islamic law was argued to be complete 
and unchanging, in no need of addition or modification in view of chang-
ing circumstances. The conservatives eventually rejected constitutionalism 
altogether. The Iranian clerics remained divided over constitutionalism.
The Assembly was bombarded in late June 1908, shortly after a 
committee-directed failed assassination attempt against the shah. The 
armed committees that had taken positions in and around the Assembly 
matters falling within their scope, it failed to spell out their sphere of authority.
50 This is a modification of Browne’s translation that reads “The sovereignty is a trust con-
fided (as a Divine gift) by the people to the person of the King.”
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compound fell easily to the more disciplined Cossack Brigade. With the fall 
of Tehran, a thirteen-month bloody struggle ensued between the loyalists 
and constitutionalists throughout Iran. Russia used the disorder to take 
control of northwestern Iran. In the rest of the country, the constitutional 
forces – composed of the committees, revolutionaries from the Caucasus 
including the Armenian Dashnak, provincial militaries in the north, and 
Bakhtiari tribes from the south – managed to capture Tehran in a coordi-
nated assault in July 1909. The shah was deposed and his minor son as-
sumed the throne under a regent. Ayatollah Nuri was publicly hanged.
The re-establishment of the Assembly marked the introduction of for-
mal political parties. Yet, the disorder that followed the ordeal of a year-
long civil war ultimately prepared the ground for Russian and British in-
tervention in the north and south. The constitutional movement came to 
a formal end after Bakhtiari militias shut down the Assembly at the end of 
1911 following Russia’s threat to occupy Tehran.
7 The Aftermath
The strongman that emerged in the aftermath, Reza Shah, has been imag-
ined officially and popularly as the founder of modern Iran. What was his 
connection to the preceding constitutional movement, and can we gain a 
better understanding of him and the fate of religion in Iran by placing him 
in the trajectory of that movement?
The counterrevolutionary period from June 1908 to July 1909, un-
leashed the centrifugal forces at the periphery that pushed the door further 
open to foreign intervention. This, combined with a weak middle class and 
the absence of a centralized modern military, formally brought the consti-
tutional movement to an end. A decade of disorder followed during and 
after the First World War, with Russia consolidating in the north and the 
British settling in the south.
However, the opportunity for vibrant constitutionalism was not yet lost. 
As the important work of Stephanie Cronin has shown, the institution of the 
gendarmerie, the brainchild of the constitutional movement, was primed to 
protect a future republic with its highly trained, educated, and nationalist 
staff. Its foreign-trained officers, some hailing from the military academy 
of Istanbul (Harbiye), had affinities with the Young Turks and admired the 
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Kemalist movement. Even though the gendarmerie was only a nascent insti-
tution with a small officer corps, it remained Iran’s best chance of survival, 
and with its solid constitutional pedigree, its best democratic alternative. 
A fateful contingency, however, derailed the democratic route, if not en-
tirely the constitutional one. The gendarmerie was at the height of its power 
and popularity when it collaborated with Reza Khan’s Cossack Brigade, in 
the 1921 coup against the monarchy, to inch closer to a republic. However, 
by the end of that year, the ambitious and skillful future ruler of Iran, Reza 
Khan, had sidelined the gendarmerie, his partner, and begun a process of 
incorporation and consolidation of that force under the Cossacks.51 This out-
come was particularly surprising, given that the better-trained, disciplined, 
organized, and numerically larger gendarmerie was poised to assume power 
as the protector of the constitution and the Assembly.
Four years later, Reza Khan, after initially considering a republic, 
declared himself the new shah of Iran. The battered and weakened 
post-constitutional Iranian clerics, greatly alarmed at Ataturk’s republican 
secularist reforms, played a crucial role in convincing him against the re-
publican route. The clerics thought of Reza Khan as a safe choice because 
of his demonstrated lack of hostility toward religion during the first two 
phases of his rule, from 1921–1925 before assuming the throne, and the 
two years afterwards, from 1925–1927. From 1927 to 1941, the third phase, 
Reza Shah put all pretensions aside and undertook a series of repressive 
cultural and institutional measures both against democratic institutions 
and religion. On the one hand, his undertakings pacified and isolated the 
mainstream religion in the newly instituted seminary at Qom which be-
came resigned to its fate. On the other hand, his regime managed to radi-
calize religion outside the Qom mainstream.52 His rule was characterized 
by increasing military dominance over civilian authority, arbitrariness, 
corruption, nepotism, and the accumulation of enormous wealth by the 
shah and his military commanders who served as his key administrators. 
After co-opting the state-building programs of the constitutionalists, he 
curtailed constitutional rights, and rendered the Assembly ineffective after 
51 Stephanie Cronin, The Army and Creation of the Pahlavi State in Iran, 1910–26 (London: 
I. B. Tauris, 1997).
52 Mohammad H. Faghfoory, “The Ulama-State Relations in Iran: 1921–1941,” Internation-
al Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 4 (1987); Mohammad H. Faghfoory, “The Impact 
of Modernization on the Ulama in Iran, 1925–1941,” Iranian Studies 26, no. 3/4 (1993).
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1926. Reza Shah was an outsider to the revolution. When the constitution-
alists begrudgingly rallied behind him, it was for lack of a better alterna-
tive. They settled on a candidate who could at least bring to fruition their 
state-building aspirations, if not their democratic ones. And Reza Shah did 
build a stronger state than the constitutionalists had managed to do: he 
implemented forced sedentarization of tribes, a new army of conscripts, 
state sponsorship of mandatory free education, infrastructural works, and 
the beginnings of a welfare state. Women experienced legal and social im-
provements, but he also left behind a legacy of forced unveiling with mixed 
memories and results. Overall, his harsh measures came at the expense of 
the constitutional movement’s hard-won political agenda.
But whereas the gendarmerie was sure to be an authoritarian institu-
tion in a republican setting in emulation of Ataturk republicanism, it was 
to be different from Reza Shah who displayed despotic behavior. Unlike 
the gendarmerie, Reza Shah was not part of the grain of the constitutional 
movement or a rising educated middle class. For our purposes, the issue 
becomes: how would religion fare any differently under the gendarmerie? 
This is a counter-factual question, but one that is important for evaluating 
the significance of the rise of Reza Shah and the fate of religion in Iran. 
One can perhaps speculate that, given the gendarmerie’s more democratic 
nature and approach, Westernization and repression would not have been 
coupled together nearly to the same extent as under Reza Shah or Pahlavis 
in general. Be that as it may, why should one believe religion would have 
fared any better under the republican agenda? For one, it is doubtful that 
their ideologically driven secularism project from the top would have been 
as repressive as Reza Shah’s given their solid connections to the constitu-
tional movement, and to the popular committees to which they owed a 
great debt. More importantly, under Reza Shah the move toward secularity 
that had begun under the committees was brought to a complete halt. Reza 
Shah’s suppression of the nascent federalist movements throughout Iran 
was an important part of that process. These movements (e.g. the Gilan 
Jangal movement, the Azerbaijan Khiabani movement, etc.) were an out-
growth of the earlier regional committees. Their suppression put an end to 
the federalist alternative to democratization, cut off the public from venues 
of political expression and blocked off the popular route to secularity.
In the end, the democratic project was derailed almost entirely because 
of the institutional weakness that allowed the rise of a personality and an 
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institution alien to the constitutional movement. Nonetheless, with its first 
revolution, Iran had started out on the global constitutional path, and al-
though its inertia could be tempered, it could not be pushed off that road 
entirely.
Between 1941 and 1953, for example, constitutionalism roared back to 
life. With the abdication of Reza Shah in 1941, the first phase of his son’s 
rule (1941–1953) was characterized by the full blooming of parliamentari-
an politics, political party formation, and a robust trade union movement. 
The public, instead of choosing the route of political Islam, rallied enthu-
siastically behind the starkly non-religious constitutional party of the Na-
tional Front (Mossadegh) and the Tudeh Communist Party. This period of 
political opening also witnessed the first appearance of miniscule fringe, 
radical-terroristic Islamist groupings (e.g. Fedaiyan-i Islam or martyrs of 
Islam with spiritual support from Khomeini) in explicit reaction to the 
harsh secularist policies of Reza Shah and the forced marginalization of 
religion that his rule entailed.
The 1953 coup and the overthrow of Mossadegh in the entanglement of 
global oil politics, brought this political opening to an end as well and the 
National Front and Tudeh Party were dismantled. It is in its aftermath that 
we witness the emergence of political Islam in the 1960s, and the appear-
ance of mosque and religious networks as safe havens and zones of auton-
omy that served as the sole venues for expressing of political dissent. We 
also witness the appearance of religiously-tinged liberal and leftist move-
ments in acknowledgement of the growing clout of religion and in search 
of alliance with it. Yet, this is a history that cannot be written without ref-
erence to global oil politics and the rise of wealthy rentier states which 
have extensive surveillance and repressive infrastructural capabilities, exist 
autonomously form their publics and are without need for political bar-
gaining because they are largely free from the burden of taxation.53 While 
all these conditions facilitated the growth of political Islam, its victory was 
far from inevitable, but when it did emerge through a series of contingen-
cies, it opened a new path in Iranian history, and perhaps even in regional 
and global histories.
53 For an excellent example, see Mottahedeh, The Mantle of the Prophet.
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8 Appendix (Selections from the Supplement)54
Art. 1. The official religion of Persia is Islam, according to the orthodox Ja-
fari doctrine of the Ithna Ashariyya (Church of the Twelve Imams), which 
faith (1) the Shah of Persia must profess and promote. 
Art. 2. At no time must any legal enactment of the Sacred National Con-
sultative Assembly, established by the favour and assistance of his Holiness 
the Imam of the Age (may God hasten his glad advent!),(2) the favour of 
his Majesty the Shahinshah of Islam (may God immortalise his reign!), the 
care of the Proofs of Islam (3) (may God multiply the like of them!), and 
the whole people of the Persian nation, be at variance with the sacred prin-
ciples of Islam or the laws established by his Holiness the Best of Mankind 
(4) (on whom and on whose household be the Blessings of God and His 
Peace!). It is hereby declared that it is for the learned doctors of theology 
(the ulama) – may God prolong the blessing of their existence! – to deter-
mine whether such laws as may be proposed are or are not conformable to 
the principles of Islam; and it is therefore officially enacted that there shall at 
all times exist a Committee composed of not less than five mujtahids or other 
devout theologians, cognisant also of the requirements of the age, [which 
committee shall be elected] in this manner. The ulama and Proofs of Islam 
shall present to the National Consultative Assembly the names of twenty of 
the ulama possessing the attributes mentioned above; and the Members of 
the National Consultative Assembly shall, either by unanimous acclamation 
or by vote, designate five or more of these, according to the exigencies of 
the time, and recognise these as members, so that they may carefully discuss 
and consider all matters proposed in the Assembly, and reject and repudiate, 
wholly or in part, any such proposal which is at variance with the Sacred 
Laws of Islam, so that it shall not obtain the title of legality. In such matters 
the decision of this Ecclesiastical Committee shall be followed and obeyed, 
and this article shall continue unchanged until the appearance of his Holiness 
the Proof of the Age (may God hasten his glad Advent!).
Rights of the Persian Nation.
Art. 8. The people of the Persian Empire are to enjoy equal rights before the Law. 
Art. 9. All individuals are protected and safeguarded in respect to their 
lives, property, homes, and honour, from every kind of interference, and 
none shall molest them save in such case and in such way as the laws of the 
land shall determine.
54 For the translation of the 1907 Supplement, see Edward G. Browne, The Persian Revolu-
tion of 1905–1909 (London: Frank Cass, 1966), 372–84.
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Art. 18. The acquisition and study of all sciences, arts and crafts is free, save 
in the case of such as may be forbidden by the ecclesiastical law. 
Art. 19. The foundation of schools at the expense of the Government and 
the Nation, and compulsory instruction, must be regulated by the Ministry 
of Sciences and Arts, and all schools and colleges must be under the su-
preme control and supervision of that Ministry.
Art. 20. All publications, except heretical books and matters hurtful to the 
perspicuous religion [of Islam] are free, and are exempt from the censor-
ship. If, however, anything should be discovered in them contrary to the 
Press Law, the publisher or writer is liable to punishment according to that 
law. If the writer be known, and be resident in Persia, then the publisher, 
printer and distributor shall not be liable to prosecution.
Art. 26. The powers of the realm are all derived from the people; and the 
Fundamental Law regulates the employment of those powers.
Art. 27. The powers of the Realm are divided into three categories: First, 
the legislative power, which is specially concerned with the making or ame-
lioration of laws. This power is derived from his Imperial Majesty, the Na-
tional Consultative Assembly and the Senate, of which three sources each 
has the right to introduce laws, provided that the continuance thereof be 
dependent on their not being at variance with the standards of the ecclesi-
astical law, and on their approval by the Members of the two Assemblies, 
and the Royal ratification. The enacting and approval of laws connected 
with the revenue and expenditure of the Kingdom are, however, specially 
assigned to the National Consultative Assembly. The explanation and in-
terpretation of the laws are, moreover, amongst the special functions of the 
above-mentioned Assembly. Second, the judicial power, by which is meant 
the determining of rights. This power belongs exclusively to the ecclesias-
tical tribunals in matters connected with the ecclesiastical law, and to the 
civil tribunals in matters connected with ordinary law.
Rights of the Persian Throne.
Art. 35. Kingship (Sultanate) is a trust confided as a Divine gift by the peo-
ple to the person of the King.55
Art. 36. The constitutional Monarchy of Persia is vested in the person of his 
Imperial Majesty Sultan…
55 This is a modification of Browne’s translation that reads “The sovereignty is a trust con-
fided (as a Divine gift) by the people to the person of the King.”
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Art. 44. The person of the King is exempted from responsibility. The Min-
isters of State are responsible to both Chambers in all matters.
Art. 57. The Royal prerogatives and powers are only those explicitly men-
tioned in the present Constitutional Law.
Concerning the Ministers. 
Art. 58. No one can attain the rank of Minister unless he be a Musulman by 
religion, a Persian by birth, and a Persian subject.
Art. 64. Ministers cannot divest themselves of their responsibility by plead-
ing verbal or written orders from the King.
Art. 71. The Supreme Ministry of Justice and the judicial tribunals are the 
places officially destined for the redress of public grievances, while judg-
ment in all matters falling within the scope of the Ecclesiastical Law is vest-
ed in just mujtahids possessing the necessary qualifications.
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